Real Smart Descartes

If we are to stick to Leibniz’s Law in being the deciding factor between Cartesian Dualism and JJC Smart’s ‘identity theory’, we must first understand why this law is true or not. It says that two different things cannot have the exact same properties and still be two different things. They could be entirely identical (like two cars of the same model fresh off the assembly line), however, they would not have the same spatial location. Thus, one property remains different from the two similar objects. However, if two things have different properties but are still considered to be the same thing, only under a different condition, then we must include that condition as a different property; thus two things. I believe Leibniz’s Law to be the turning point in this argument because both philosophers are attempting to support or dispute it in a way. It is also a great place to start because its logic is easy to understand.

Descartes argues that the mind is separate from the body because the two have different properties. His thinking is simple.  Since the body is divisible, and the mind is indivisible, the mind has a property that the body does not. Therefore, according to Leibniz’s Law, the mind is separate from the body.

            Smart’s case relies on proving brain processes and mental sensations are one in the same thing. The key to understanding this is the mind/body connection. If what happens to your body is so finely connected to the feelings of your surroundings, then your mind and body cannot be separate from themselves. However, according to Leibniz’s law, if we can distinguish two different things as having different properties, then they cannot be the same thing. A brain process is the nerval connection in the body that results in the actual feeling of a sensation. A mental state would be the feeling of the sensation itself like a pain in your arm or hearing a concerto. If I am able to distinguish the two in such a way, it wouldn’t seem that they would be the same thing. In other words, if his argument is that brain processes and mental sensations are the same thing, then how can anyone use the term in its own definition? A brain process is what results in a mental sensation. It is a proven fact that it takes a certain amount of time for any brain process to actually reach the brain. Smart counters by saying a young boy and the same boy, only older (The General), have different properties but are still the same person. The only thing that changes is their temporal property. So what can we consider his identity if his mind and body undergo dramatic changes throughout his lifetime?

Descartes’ argument centers on the sensation of touch. He says that the connection from the foot to the brain, with regards to the nervous system, is deceitful. One may have a pain in one’s foot but it may not be because one’s foot is actually experiencing physical stimulation. It could be from stimulation in another place along the nerval connection (say the spine) that causes one to experience a sensation somewhere else. Another way to argue this would be to take Descartes’ separation of the body example quite literally by severing a bodily appendage. Why would we have a mental sensation of an itch on an arm that doesn’t exist? But one could argue that it only proves the mind is more connected to the body because it has a conception of itself that is no longer there. I would say that if the brain were so in tune with its body, it would understand the fact that its limb is no longer there.

Smart handles his discussion primarily from the sensation of sight. Or rather one of the anomalies that comes along with sight. He begins by using color, an adjective commonly used to describe something physical, to describe something non-physical, a yellowish-orange after image. By doing this, he attempts to say that the mental sensation of seeing the after image is the same as having the brain process of seeing an actual thing. And since we cannot describe such a mental sensation other than by means of something physical, then it must be a physical thing that has physical properties.

The power of his argument, comes from his use of color and how it’s used to describe purely physical things. My objection to this is that Smart describes it as being “yellowish-orange,” but I may come to describe it as being blue, red, yellow, and orange at the same time. How is it possible for something that is physical to have all of these properties at the same time? Also, the experience of seeing the after image is not exactly like an experience of seeing something physical. After a while of staring at the after image, it will eventually disappear. It also remains visible (even more so) when I close my eyes, which is a property that no physical thing (other than the back of my eyelids) has. So if I can say that the after image has at least one property that physical things do not, then we can conclude that the after image is not the same as seeing a physical thing, even if it is a noun.

Descartes reasons that physical things have physical properties such as having a spatial location, having size, having shape, having weight, being subject to the laws of physics, and being directly observable. Mental things primarily have unphysical characteristics such as having no location, no size, no extension, no weight, they are not subject to the laws of physics and are not directly observable (although apparently everyone has a ‘tell’). He says that the mind and body are connected as a singular unit, but since the mind has a property that the body does not, it must be distinct from the body.

            The substance of Smart’s argument is much like saying you cannot have music without a particular dynamic describing the volume at which it is played. It is easy to imagine a piece of music without any dynamics written in, however, it is impossible to actually the play music without playing it at a particular level. The dynamics construct the emotions (or the feelings) of the piece while the music provides the layout for which it is played. Descartes would say that they are two different things with different properties that coincide with one another in synchronicity. The sheet of music is a physical thing that contains dynamic markings (physical markings that are related to the abstract). However, Smart would argue that you cannot have music without the dynamics. You cannot express a dynamic without playing a note that expresses it. It would be foolish to think that one could play a concerto, silently. But having now brought up this analogy, it seems I have only proven that the body cannot exist without the mind, which we know not to be true (a dead body exists and does not have a working mind). Or maybe I should rather say that a singular body can exist but we can only consider it a person if there is a working mind behind it.

            However, it would also appear that I am excluding the idea of spatial temporal identity. Smart would argue that water and ice are composed of the same thing, but the density of ice is different from that of water. Therefore, ice has a different property from water even though it is composed of the same elements. This seems to disprove Leibniz’ Law in a kind of way. Obviously the argument still holds that the spatial identity between a glass of ice and an ice cube remain different. However, the characteristic of ice is also a property of water. It freezes when under the right conditions. It is similar to Smart’s ‘General’ argument. The boy and the General are the same person with different characteristics, but only if we examine them outside of their spatial temporal locations. The ice is different from water, but if we give the ice time to melt, it will eventually become water. But still what does that say about the identity of a person over time? Well what is it that changes the General from the young boy he once was? It’s the experiences he has and the memories he maintains of himself growing as an individual through time. Water has other properties, but they will only come into being under the right circumstances.

            The point of arguing all of this is to ultimately determine whether or not the soul continues to exist after bodily death. It is a question that reaches at the core of human existence. Is there a point of living if we are nothing but physical beings that have no way of interacting with anything outside of this physical realm? According to Occam’s Razor, we should remain loyal to the hypothesis that leaves the most variables out of the final product. In which case, it would seem that Smart’s hypothesis is the simplest because it doesn’t require further questioning outside of our realm of knowledge. However, Smart’s theory does appear to violate Leibniz’ Law.

            For the question of immortality, I would say that it depends on what degree of immortality we are addressing. Escaping bodily death would seem impossible according to the laws of thermodynamics (entropy). However, if we would like to appease to the fans of Occam’s Razor, then we cannot assume anything that we cannot possibly know to be true. That being said, there are some people who have escaped death. So long as the human race continues as it should, their stories will continue to live on through books, music, folk tales, movies, etc. Achilles may not be around anymore, but we still know the story of his battle against Troy and his quest to be remembered.

            Essentially, what I am trying to say is that I believe everyone has two identities. However, I’m not exactly siding with the Cartesian Dualist. I’m rather siding with Occam’s Razor. For now, it is no longer a question of the soul after death or whether God exists. As far as we know, living human beings are the only things that are capable of raising the questions of identity, the soul, and life after death. Even if our souls did continue to exist after death, it would only be the souls of the living that will persist to care about you and vice versa. Your living identity (bodily identity) is how you’re perceived by the world around you. Your lasting identity (post-mortem) is measured by the impact you made on the world while you were still alive. Is it possible that one could exist and not be perceived at all? Yes. Is it also possible that one could live their whole lives without having an impact? Of course. But it would also seem possible that these people wouldn’t have an identity as far as we’re concerned. If a tree falls in the woods, but nothing is around to hear it, does it still make a sound? My answer is no. Your identity is dependant on you.